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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. Appellee Discover Bank's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment did not 
contain any request to withdraw deemed admissions nor did it even mention the 
deemed admissions. (R. 90-93.) 
• ' ' • ' ' ; • ' 2 
2. The trial court's Judgment and Order did not withdraw deemed admissions nor 
did it even mention consideration of the deemed admissions or somehow 
treating Discover Bank's Motion for Summary 7i/Jgme^ as a motion to 
withdraw. (R. 138-139.) 
3. The trial court's Judgment and Order was entered without a hearing or any 
ruling or other memoranda, such as grounds for the determination, findings of 
fact or conclusions of law. (R. 138-139.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHERE THE TRIAL COURT BELOW NEVER WITHDREW 
DEEMED ADMISSIONS OR MADE DETERMINATIONS GERMANE 
TO WITHDRAWAL OF DEEMED ADMISSIONS, THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN WITHDRAWING ADMISSIONS IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Appellee/Plaintiff Discover Bank (hereinafter "Discover Bank" or "Appellee") 
sidesteps the issue of the trial court's avoidance of procedural requirements. Appellee 
assumes that the trial court made a decision to withdraw the deemed admissions even 
though it was not within the trial court's discretion to do so nor did the trial court make 
any findings to that affect. In its Appellee's Brief Discover Bank spends a great deal of 
space trying to show this Court that "withdrawal of the Appellee's admissions serves the 
presentation of the merits and does not result in prejudice to the Appellant." See 
Appellee's Brief p. 4-7 (citing to Utah R. Civ. P. 36(c) and relating iheLangeland v. 
Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1060-61 (Utah 1998), two-step process to review a 
trial court's decision to deny or permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions). 
However, this ignores the fact that this analysis is not appropriate given that the trial court 
never made a determination regarding the withdrawal of deemed admissions and there 
was never a motion to withdraw before the trial court that would have given it discretion 
to do so. See Part II, infra. Discover Bank never made any effort to ask the trial court to 
have the deemed admissions amended or withdrawn. Accordingly, this Court need not 
engage in the Langeland two-step analysis to review the trial court's withdrawal of 
deemed admissions since no such withdrawal was ever made by the trial court below. 
II. DISCOVER BANK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BELOW 
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSTRUED AS AN IMPLIED MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW DEEMED ADMISSIONS WHERE IT MADE NO 
REQUEST OR EFFORT TO HAVE THE DEEMED ADMISSIONS 
WITHDRAWN. 
No motion to amend or withdraw the deemed admissions was ever made by 
Discover Bank in the lower court, whether in proper form or implied. Appellee Discover 
Bank now attempts to argue, for the first time on appeal, the issues germane to a motion 
to withdraw deemed admissions. Before this appeal, Discover Bank never even 
mentioned the deemed admissions in any of its pleadings, let alone request that they be 
withdrawn. The trial court did not, in its Judgment and Order (R. 138-140), make its 
ruling on Discover Bank's motion for summary judgment on the basis of arguments 
concerning withdrawal of deemed admissions. 
Opposing counsel cites to Brunettiv. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
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to argue that Discover Bank's motion for summary judgment should be treated as an 
implied motion to withdraw deemed admissions. While this Court in Brunetti did allow a 
motion for summary judgment, wherein the issues addressing withdrawal of admissions 
were fully briefed, to also be treated as an implied motion to withdraw deemed 
admissions, the facts in Brunetti are clearly distinguishable. 
In Brunetti, there was a discrepancy over when discovery responses were actually 
sent. The Plaintiff attached discovery requests to the original summons and complaint 
served on the Defendant. The Defendant answered the complaint but did not send a 
response to the request for admissions until November 22, 1989 when they were due on 
November 16,1989. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in May of 1990 
based on deemed admissions asserting that he had never received a response to his 
request for admissions. Defendant responded to the summary judgment motion and 
attached his response to the request for admissions along with its mailing certificate 
reflecting the November mailing date and an affidavit from counsel asserting that to his 
knowledge the response had been mailed accordingly. Plaintiff filed a reply to 
Defendant's response "in which he further clarified his position that the said admissions 
should be admitted and not allowed to be withdrawn." Id, at 556. After a hearing on the 
motion, the trial court denied Plaintiffs motion. After a bench trial in January of 1991, 
Plaintiff appealed claiming the trial court erred in not granting his motion for summary 
judgment, from at least eight months prior, where Defendant's response to Plaintiffs 
• 5 : " : ; : . -
request for admissions were not received until after he filed for summary judgment. 
On appeal, this Court found in Brunetti that, under the circumstances, the trial 
court's denial of Plaintiff s motion constituted authorization for withdrawal of the 
deemed admissions. In making this determination, this Court noted however that (1) 
"[Defendant's] response to the request for admissions, although never received, had in 
fact been previously mailed in good faith to the court," (2) Defendant "convinced the 
Court that his failure to timely respond was due to a reasonable oversight" where the 
discovery requests had come stapled to the complaint, (3) the trial court "determined that 
the merits of the action would be undermined unless the admission were withdrawn," and 
(4) Plaintiff never argued "that he would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the said 
admissions." Id. at 558-59. In Brunetti, this Court also distinguished Jensen {Jensen v. 
Pioneer Dodge Ctr.9 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985)) and Whitaker {Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 
P.2d 685 (Utah 1985)) from the circumstances in Brunetti by stating that in these cases, 
the supreme court "reversed and remanded the trial court's decision to ignore admissions 
because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the party opposing the admissions 
had made any attempt to withdraw or amend the said admissions." Brunetti at 559. "Here 
[in Brunetti], all of the documents before the trial court on Brunetti's motion for summary 
judgment solely and specifically addressed the issue of whether the requested admissions 
should be admitted or withdrawn, and the trial court denied Brunetti's motion precisely 
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on the basis of the arguments in those documents.55! Id (emphasis added). While both 
Brunetti and the case at bar involve deemed admissions and a motion for summary 
judgment, that is as far as the similarities go. Beyond these, the circumstances are vastly 
different. 
First, in the case at bar, there is no discrepancy as to when discovery responses 
were mailed by Discover Bank; responses were sent more than seventy (70) days beyond 
1 The authority the court in Brunetti relied upon to justify looking "to the substance of [a] 
document, and not merely to its caption55 was DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 
P.2d 520, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 
1061, 1064 (Utah 1991). These cases dealt with post-judgment motions where the 
caption did not match the substance of what the motion was requesting. The courts 
characterized objections in motions filed within ten days after an entry of judgment as a 
post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule 52(b) or 59(e). Ironically, Brunetti, has been 
overruled as to this principle by Gillett v. Price, 135 P.3d 861 (Utah 2006) wherein the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[R]egardless of the motion's substance, postjudgment motions to reconsider and 
other similarly titled motions will not toll the time for appeal because they are not 
recognized by our rules. We realize that this holding repudiates a long line of cases 
from both the court of appeals and this court treating motions to reconsider as rule-
sanctioned motions based on the substance of the motion. We are now persuaded 
that it is time this practice comes to an end. In our system, the rules provide the 
source of available relief. They are designed to provide a pattern of regularity of 
procedure which the parties and the courts can follow and rely upon. Accordingly, 
the form of a motion does matter because it directs the court and litigants to the 
specific, and available, relief sought. . . Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from a 
judgment, it must turn to the rules to determine whether relief exists, and if so, 
direct the court to the specific relief available. Parties can no longer leave this task 
to the court by filing so-called motions to reconsider and relying upon district 
courts to construe the motions within the rules. 
Id. at 863 (internal quotations and citations omitted). While Mr. Kendall realizes that this 
holding deals with post-judgment motions for relief and is only binding in that context, he 
asserts that the dicta shows the growing desire that courts have for litigants to properly 
caption and apply for specific relief as provided by the rules. 
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the deadline and only after Mr. Kendall filed his motion for summary judgment. The time 
for moving the court to withdraw admissions should not be after a motion for summary 
judgment.2 In its recitation of the facts, Appellee Discover Bank conveniently omits the 
efforts Appellant Kevin Kendall took to remind and then ultimately compel some type of 
a response to his discovery requests from Discover Bank. It was only after the time and 
expense of a letter (R. 59), a motion to compel (R. 31-33), and a subsequent motion for 
summary judgment (R. 60-61), that Discover Bank, the original Plaintiff who was to be 
prosecuting the case3, finally responded to discovery requests and gave a cursory 
opposition to Mr. Kendall's summary judgment motion (R. 86-87), notably, one that did 
not address the merits of the motion or even mention the deemed admissions or request 
their withdrawal. 
Second, in this case, there was no "reasonable oversight" as to the due date for the 
2 The treatment of Federal Rule 36(b) is both logical and persuasive and lends 
insight to the case at bar. "Since Rule 36 admissions, whether express or by 
default, are conclusive as to the matters admitted, they cannot be overcome at the 
summary judgment stage by contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in 
the summary judgment record . . . Instead, the proper course for a litigant that 
wishes to avoid the consequences of failing to timely respond to Rule 36 requests 
for admission is to move the court to amend or withdraw the default admissions in 
accordance with the standard outlined in Rule 36(b)." Carney v. IRS (In re 
Carney), 258 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. Tex. 2001) (emphasis added). 
3 In Brunetti v. Mascaro, it was the Defendant who opposed the deemed admissions and 
asked the court for relief from them. In the present case, it is the Plaintiff, Discover 
Bank, who was supposed to be prosecuting the case, that was clearly dilatory in 
responding to discovery requests and moving the case forward and who now wants relief 
from deemed admissions even though he never requested such relief in the trial court. 
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response to requested admissions; the discovery requests were served separately from the 
complaint (R. 15-16) and not stapled to the back of the complaint as mBrunetti. 
Third, the trial court below made no determinations as to how the merits of the 
action or prejudice to the nonmoving party might be affected if the admissions were not 
withdrawn. If a motion to withdraw deemed admissions had been before the trial court, 
whether actually or implied, the trial court, in order to not be found to have abused its 
discretion, would have needed to make determinations that the affect of a withdrawal of 
admissions would serve the merits of the action and not cause the requesting party to 
suffer prejudice. See Utah R. Civ. P. 36(c). 
Fourth, although Mr. Kendall has not made arguments with regard to how he 
would be prejudiced if the admissions were to be withdrawn, this is because he has not 
been required to do so thus far where no such motion was ever before the lower court or 
fully briefed. Discover Bank has made hay with the assertion that Mr. Kendall has not 
put forward any proof that the deemed admission at issue is in fact true. Appellee 
misapprehends the purpose behind Rule 36(c). It is meant to release the party who gained 
the deemed admission of the burden of needing to present evidence on the matter deemed 
admitted. The burden is not on the Appellant to prove the truth of the deemed admission 
but is now on the Appellee to request the admission be withdrawn and to prove "that the 
deemed admission is in fact untrue." That Appellant has not put forward additional 
evidence beyond the deemed admission to show its truth is not at issue here. 
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Fifth, and similarly, the documents and motion for summary judgment before the 
lower court did not "solely and specifically address[] the issue of whether the 
[]admissions should be admitted or withdrawn," and the trial court did not grant Discover 
Bank's motion "precisely on the basis of the arguments in those documents." Brunetti at 
559. The trial court's Judgment and Order does not mention deemed admissions or any 
consideration of issues germane to their withdrawal. (R. 138-39.) It merely awards 
judgment "as requested in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 138.) A 
reading of Plaintiffs Memorandum.in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment likewise 
does not mention deemed admissions or any consideration of issues germane to their 
withdrawal. (R. 90-93.) The substance of Discover Bank's motion did not have to do 
with deemed admissions or request they be withdrawn. Instead, it focused solely on the 
requirements for summary judgment under Rule 56 and completely ignored the deemed 
admissions. The motion, at most, merely presented additional evidence, something which 
Kotter v. Kotter, 206 P.3d 633, 639-640 (Utah Ct. App. 2009), indicates is insufficient for 
purposes of requesting a withdrawal of admissions.4 
4 Where a party makes "no effort to have the admissions amended or withdrawn... [but] 
merely presents] additional evidence on [the] issue," the court will not engage in further 
analysis but will find the admissions "conclusively established and legally binding." 
Kotter, 206 P.3d at 640; see also W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. Village, 568 P.2d 
734, 736-737 (Utah 1977) (holding that where defendant made no motion to withdraw or 
amend admissions but merely submitted an affidavit supporting its belated denial of 
admissions, the matters deemed admitted were conclusively established). 
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III. IT WOULD BE BAD POLICY TO ALLOW A TRIAL COURT TO 
UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS WITHOUT A PARTY 
REQUESTING IN THEIR OWN MOTION THAT THEY BE 
WITHDRAWN. 
It is not requisite with justice that a Plaintiff initiate an action for their own benefit, 
not respond to a Defendant's discovery requests, reminder letter, and motion to compel, 
and then, after Defendant has incurred expenses for all these plus the filing of his motion 
for summary judgment, that Plaintiff suddenly be rewarded for all their delays by the trial 
court being allowed to ignore Rule 36(c) procedure and grant a cross-motion for summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff yet contrary to deemed admissions. This is especially true 
where, here, Discover Bank's motion for summary judgment did not ask for any treatment 
of deemed admissions, in form or substance, and the trial court did not make any findings 
or rulings stating that it had considered issues germane to withdrawing deemed 
admissions or that it was even withdrawing the deemed admissions. If the substance of a 
trial court's order granting a motion does not make any findings or rulings withdrawing 
the deemed admissions, and the substance of the motion itself does not request 
withdrawal or even discuss the deemed admissions, it would be bad policy to, after the 
fact, declare the substance of the motion to be one requesting withdrawal of the deemed 
admissions. See FN1, supra. Otherwise, the predictability and fairness that the rules of 
civil procedure are aimed to secure is lost. The net result would be to introduce 
uncertainty into most motions before a court. The opposing party would be uncertain as 
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to whether or not a judge would transform a motion into a specific request despite the 
substance of the motion being void of any discussion regarding such a request. A judge 
could eclipse a motion before the court based on his own inclinations and feelings as to 
what should happen in the case. It would follow then that a judge would not have to 
make any findings or conclusions in an attendant order declaring what he is in substance 
doing—transforming the motion before the court into something else entirely. If a judge 
could impute requests to a party even without the party requesting it or facts before him 
pertaining to the factors or issues germane to that request, the effect would be to make 
Rule 36(c) of no real import or affect. 
IV. PARTIES WHO OBEY THE RULES SHOULD BE REWARDED AND 
PARTIES WHO DISOBEY THE RULES SHOULD BE PUNISHED. 
It should go without saying that all parties should follow the rules, that 
those who do should be rewarded and those who do not should not benefit from 
their disobedience at another party's expense. Unfortunately, in the instant matter, 
Mr. Kendall, who obeyed the rules and used the legal means available to him to 
move the case forward to resolution, at his expense, was steam rolled by the trial 
court's Judgment and Order. On the other hand, Discover Bank broke the rules 
and is now being unfairly rewarded. 
Mr. Kendall asks this Court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment to Discover Bank and grant summary judgment in his favor. Mr. Kendall 
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is concerned that a reverse and remand will simply be a roadmap to show Discover 
Bank how to maneuver its way out of its rule-breaking. Discover Bank has already 
received preferential treatment by the trial court and that treatment will likely 
continue unless the trial court's subsequent denial5 of Mr. Kendall's motion is 
reversed. 
This is not the first time that courts have cut off litigation regarding the 
deemed admissions upon the filing of a motion for summary judgment based on 
the deemed admissions. In both Jensen and Langeland, the Utah Supreme Court 
dealt harshly with parties who only sought to withdraw and amend its deemed 
admissions after a motion for summary judgment was filed. See Appellate Brief 
pp. 13-14 for further details. In the instant matter, the situation is even more 
egregious where Discover Bank has not even sought to withdraw the deemed 
admissions. It was only after Mr. Kendall filed his Motion for Summary Judgment 
Based on Deemed Admissions (R. 60-61) that Discover Bank began to move 
forward with its case. Accordingly, Mr. Kendall should not be punished for 
obeying the rules while a national bank is rewarded for breaking them. 
Litigation must come to an end sometime, and the rules of procedure are 
intended to provide an orderly schedule for moving cases along their track 
to conclusion—not to squander legal, judicial, and financial resources by 
5 The lower court did not deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (June 21, 
2012; see Court Docket) until after Defendant had filed this appeal (June 7, 2012; see R. 
144-145). From a procedural standpoint, this makes the case more difficult where the 
lower court's denial of that motion is not part of the record submitted to this Court. 
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generating lawsuits within lawsuits to determine whether the rules must 
actually be followed. Consequently, the court will not come to the rescue of 
a party who flagrantly ignores these rules at the expense of a party who 
attempts to conform with them. 
Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1064. 
"The penalty for delay or abuse is intentionally harsh, and parties who fail to 
comply with procedural requirements of rule 36 should not lightly escape the 
consequences of the rule." Kotter v. Kotter, 2009 UT App 60, P19 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) 
(quoting Langeland}. 
Ignoring the rules is never good policy and neither Discover Bank nor the trial 
court should be allowed to do so in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment to Appellee was in unilateral disregard of 
deemed admissions and is therefore unfounded. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Appellee should be summarily reversed, and summary 
judgment granted in favor of the Appellant. 
DATED and SIGNED this ^ day of January 2013. 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
KmilesLeBaron 
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